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A Theil's entropy index utilizing premiums written as units is employed to 
measure trends in concentration of the largest 200 property-casualty compa-
nies in the United States between 1985 and 1993 based on Best's Insurance 
Report data. Each of the indexes confirms that concentration trends experi-
enced no increase for the whole period for all 200 firms, the top 20, and sub-
sets of lower ranked companies. Significant differences are observed, however, 
between groups of companies for the same period. 
Key words and phrases: mergers and acquisitions, Theil's entropy, insurance 
1 Introduction 
Throughout its history the United States economy has experienced 
cycles of mergers and acquisitions. The most recent cycle, according 
to Shleifer and Vishny (1991) and Sikora (1995), occurred during the 
1980s. Significant factors contributing to mergers and acquisitions 
in the 1980s included laxity in antitrust enforcement policies and im-
provements in takeover technology (such as leveraged buyouts and junk 
bonds). 
The property and casualty insurance industry was not exempt from 
this merger wave. Farinella (1996) reports that between 1985 and 1995 
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some 660 corporate retirements, acquisitions, and mergers occurred in 
response to what Gart (1994) describes as tremendous changes within 
the insurance industry. Increasing competition drives the change and 
forces more company mergers, creating conglomerates of multiple func-
tion companies. Multiple functions allow a company to take advantage 
of the opportunities in the emerging financial services field. Such activ-
ities may lead insurance companies to engage in anticompetitive prac-
tices, resulting in allegations of collusion, restriction of output, and 
favorable terms from consumers. Anticompetitive practice may cause 
the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act which exempts insurance com-
panies from federal antitrust enforcements. 
Roughly 3,000 companies constitute the property-liability insurance 
industry. Due to numerous affiliations, however, there are really only 
800 independent decision-making units or groups. In 1993, accord-
ing to Huebner, Black, and Webb (1996), the net premiums written, the 
combined admitted assets, and policyholders' surplus totaled $253.8 
billion, $571.5 billion, and $182.3 billion, respectively. Policyholders' 
surplus serves as a cushion so that larger-than-expected losses can be 
paid. The abundance of cash, access to cheap capital, and low inter-
est rates helped boost the recent trend in mergers and acquisitions 
(Farinella 1996). 
There are two major conflicting arguments regarding mergers. One, 
according to Gilbert (1989), is that mergers enhance efficiency by pro-
moting consumer welfare through a superior allocation of productive, 
financial, and managerial resources. Potential competition serves as a 
control on monopoly power. Salop (1987) and Adams and Brock (1996) 
note that the rationale for this argument is provided by economists at 
the University of Chicago. Simply stated, this theory focuses on con-
sumer welfare as the sole concern. The other argument, supported by 
economists at Harvard University, is that mergers damage the overall 
working of the economy, lessen competition, and increase concentra-
tion of sales and thereby create monopoly power in a given industry. 
The process of concentration is defined as the increase in the extent 
economic activity is controlled by large firms. 
Clarke (1985) distinguishes market and aggregate concentration and 
absolute and relative concentration. Market concentration concerns a 
specific industry under the control of a few large firms which may lead 
to the exercise of monopoly power. Aggregate concentration occurs 
when a few large firms control broad segments of the economy (such as 
manufacturing, financial, and insurance sectors) or when the power of 
conglomerates extend beyond a particular industry. Changes in aggre-
gate concentration may signal a change in the distribution of economic, 
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political, or social power. Another distinction is between relative and 
absolute concentration. If all firms grow the same proportion, concen-
tration increases absolutely but relatively remains the same. Relative 
concentration is concerned with the share of output held by large firms 
among a fixed number of firms. Accordingly, various indexes are pro-
posed to measure such concentrations. 
The most widely used indexes are the k-firms concentration ratio, 
whereby the share of sales of the k largest firms (out of a total of n 
firms) are combined; the Herfindahl, defined as the sum of the shares 
of all n firms with the share of each firm weighted by itself; the Gini, 
which measures the extent to which firms in the industry are unequal 
in size; the coefficient of variation, which is the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean; and the Theil's entropy, l which is used in physics 
as a measure of disorder. Hannah and Kay (1977) find Theil's entropy 
to be one of the most satisfactory indexes. As a result, Theil's entropy 
is used throughout this paper as the measure of concentration. 
2 Past Studies 
In the two decades spanning 1973 to 1991 three studies provide ex-
cellent information on the structure of the property insurance industry. 
The common denominator of these articles is an assessment of mar-
ket concentration by product line category or by ownership category. 
Joskow (1973) informs us that the 1206 property-liability insurance 
firms as a whole in 1971 held assets of $ 68 billion and premiums of $ 35 
billion. Over half of the latter was written by the top 20 firms, resulting 
in a slight increase in concentration since 1961. Joskow also examines 
concentration within two individual lines, automobile and fire. Again, 
the top 20 firms accounted for concentration levels of approximately 
56 percent in each line, increasing from 45 percent for automobile and 
from 49 percent for fire in 1954. Joskow believes that as a result of 
effective competition, consumers moved their business from high cost 
firms to low cost firms and thereby caused concentration to increase. 
1 Entropy in used in information theory a measure of disorder. In the field of eco-
nomics, entropy is conveniently translated as a measure of the concentration of firms 
in an industry. Sawyer (1981, pp. 29) explains that this use of entropy in economics 
is justified along the lines that an industry will be more competitive the greater the 
uncertainty as to which of a given number of firms will secure the business of a buyer 
chosen at random, and entropy is a measure of this uncertainty. Note that a rise in en-
tropy indicates an increase in competitiveness and hence a decrease in concentration. 
Brockett (1991), Brockett and Song (1995), and references therein provide examples of 
other applications of information theory to actuarial science. 
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Mayers and Smith (1988) use geographical concentration, line-of-
business concentration, and specialization as indicators of success for 
the ownership type structure (Uoyds, common stock, mutual, recipro-
cal) of the insurance companies. Mayers and Smith find stock compa-
nies are less concentrated geographically than the other three forms 
of ownership. When not controlling for size, mutual companies were 
the least concentrated by line of business. When controlling for size, 
however, reciprocals were the most concentrated. 
The third significant paper, by Cummins and Weiss (1991), assesses 
concentration for the personal and commercial categories for four, ten, 
and 50 largest firms. They discover that for the personal lines in 1989 
the top four firms controlled 43.2 percent and 41.8 percent of private 
passenger auto liability and private passenger auto physical damage, 
respectively. For homeowners, 39.5 percent was controlled by the top 
four firms. On the commercial side, 26.7 percent of workers' compen-
sation was controlled by the top four firms. Cummins and Weiss echo 
the assessment of Joskow that concentration in some insurance lines 
results from the efficiency advantage some companies have in deal-
ing with clients and from gains in market share that accompany lower 
prices for insureds. 
3 Aim and Purpose 
Most studies on concentration of property insurance have been based 
on a product line category or on ownership category, the two impor-
tant classifications according to Gart (1984). Due to the two interre-
lated categories, the noticeable reorganization of the insurance indus-
try where there is increased interest in financial services, and general 
corporate mergers, many insurance companies operate on many lines 
and thus have become conglomerates. Specifically, mergers among 
competing firms, who already occupy substantial positions as pointed 
out by Manne (1965), are viewed with suspicion. 
Utton (1970) explains that where overall (aggregate) concentration 
exists, it is most likely that some individual markets will be highly con-
centrated. There are also arguments that stress the significance of ag-
gregate concentration. Among these arguments is the notion that when 
a large proportion of economic activity is held by a relatively few firms, 
it constitutes a threat to democratic government directly through pres-
sure groups and indirectly through advertising. A follow-up to this 
notion is the concern that basic policy decisions such as future invest-
ment, price, and product poliCies (which are functions associated with 
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entrepreneurship) are made by a small number of individuals, perhaps 
one or two members of the board of directors. Furthermore, large di-
versified firms can affect the market conduct even though their relative 
shares do not constitute a monopoly. If one large firm has a stronger 
position in a specific product line and another firm has a stronger po-
sition in another line, it is unlikely that any of the firms compete in the 
market where it has the advantage for fear of retaliation in the market 
where its position is not strongly established. The focus of attention, 
therefore, is the overall concentration of economic power controlled by 
a small number of large firms, typically the largest 100 or 200 enter-
prises. 
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the effects of reorganiza-
tion and mergers of recent years on aggregate concentration. Such an 
assessment will add further insight into the structure of the property-
casualty insurance industry with data from Best's Insurance Reports on 
the largest 200 American property casualty companies. Similar stud-
ies concerned with aggregate concentration in the industrial sector have 
been conducted using the Fortune 500, a popular source of data for such 
studies. Notable among these are the works by Hexter and Snow (1970), 
Nissan and Caveny (1985, 1988), Attaran and Saghafi (1988), Saghafi 
and Attaran (1990), and Deutsch and Silber (1995). The data supplied by 
Best's Insurance Reports since 1985, whereby the 200 largest American 
property-casualty companies are ranked, provide a similar opportunity 
for measuring aggregate concentration for the insurance industry. 
4 Measurement 
Using the data on shares of premiums reported in Best's Insurance 
Reports for the largest 200 firms or groups in 1985, 1989, and 1993, 
Theil's entropy is used to quantify the degree of concentration. The 
three periods 1985, 1989, and 1993 are spaced in time to show if any 
significant changes occurred. Between 1985 and 1989 approximately 
250 mergers and acquisitions occurred. Between 1990 and 1993 ap-
proximately 300 occurred. The question is whether these mergers have 
resulted in an increase in concentration. 





where Pi 2': 0 is the i-th firm's proportional share of premiums; n is the 
number of firms, and :L. Pi = 1. 
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If all n firms have an equal share, then E = log n, and concentration 
is at a minimum, in contrast to E = 0 when one firm controls all shares. 
Therefore, a decline in E corresponds to an increase in concentration. 
For a given level of entropy E*, the numbers eqUivalent, (n *), is the 
number of equally sized firms it would take to produce the same level 
of entropy E*, i.e., 
n* = eE*. (2) 
5 Empirical Results 
The largest 200 property-casualty insurance companies or groups of 
companies accounted in 1993 for 73 percent of net premiums written 
($189 billion of $259 billion), 78 percent of admitted assets ($ 527 billion 
of $672 billion), and 84 percent of holders' surplus ($153 billion of $182 
billion). These huge sums indicate that this comparably small number 
of firms held a significant control of the market. 
The three panels of Table 1 report for 1985, 1989, and 1993 the to-
tal net premiums, the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the 
maximum, and the coefficient of variation. The information in Table 1 
is supplied for the largest 200 companies as well as by smaller sets of 
four groups of companies 001-020; 021-050; 051-100; 101-200. Total 
net premiums written by the 200 companies increased from approxi-
mately $117 billion in 1985 to $189 billion in 1993, an increase of 62 
percent. The largest 20 companies accounted on average for 50 percent 
of total premiums written throughout the period, followed by the next 
30 companies of lesser rank accounting for approximately 20 percent. 
The lesser ranked sets of 50 companies and 100 companies, ranked 51 
to 100 and 101 to 200, accounted for approximately 16 percent and 15 
percent, respectively. 
In 1993 the average net premiums written for all the 200 companies 
reached almost $1 billion, with the largest 20 companies writing on 
average $4.7 billion. The smallest company among the 200 in 1993 
wrote $200 million worth of premiums, while the largest wrote well over 
$22 billion. For all 200 companies the coefficient of variation shows an 
increase from 1.81 in 1985 to 2.01 in 1989 to 2.18 in 1993. For the 
respective three periods the most noticeable increase in the coefficient 
of variation occurred for the top 20 companies, moving from 0.80 to 
0.94 to 1.12. The coefficient of variation for the other groups remained 
virtually the same throughout the three periods. 
Table 2 shows the results for the computation of the concentration 
index, the Theil's entropy E of equation (1). There are slight changes 
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Table 1 
Summary Information of Net Premiums Written 
of Largest Property.Casualty Companies 
Coefficient 
Standard of 
Com~anies Total Percent Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Variation 
Panel A: 1985 
All 200 117,103 100 586 1,058 114 10,331 1.81 
001-020 56,840 49 2,842 2,281 1,228 10,331 0.80 
021-050 23,460 20 782 183 547 1,201 0.23 
051-100 19,005 16 380 79 265 540 0.21 
101-200 17,798 15 178 46 114 264 0.26 
Panel B: 1989 
All 200 166,645 100 833 1,677 148 16,873 2.01 
001-020 83,380 50 4,169 3,920 1,664 16,873 0.94 
021-050 32,706 20 1,090 272 770 1,657 0.25 
051-100 27,010 16 540 118 350 757 0.22 
101-200 23,549 14 236 54 148 348 0.23 
Panel C: 1993 
All 200 189,030 100 945 2,060 200 22,226 2.18 
001-020 93,100 49 4,655 5,202 1,982 22,226 1.12 
021-050 36,735 20 1,225 264 879 1,882 0.22 
051-100 30,730 16 615 139 425 853 0.23 
101-200 28,465 15 285 60 200 423 0.21 
Source: Best's Insurance Reports: Property-Casualty United States (Oldwick, 
New Jersey: A.M. Best Company, 1985, 1989, and 1993) and calculations by 
the author. Total, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are in $ 
millions. 
in the magnitudes of E over time among the 200 companies, as well 
as the smaller subsets of 20, 30, 50, and 100 companies. This is also 
obvious from the numbers equivalent n * of equation (2). The numbers 
equivalent for all the 200 firms was reduced from 99 in 1985 to 92 in 
1989 to 91 in 1993. For the top 20 the sequence is 16, 15, 14. Hardly 
any change is visible for the lower ranked companies. 
Next we need to ascertain whether these apparent differences in 
entropy over time are statistically significant. Let Eij denote the entropy 
associated with the proportion of premiums (Pij) written for firm i in 
time period j, be denoted by 
Eij = - Pij log Pij (3) 
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Table 2 
Concentration of Premiums Written 
of Largest Property·Casualty Companies 
Numbers 
ComQanies Theil's Entr0I2Y (E} Standard Deviation EQuivalent 
Panel A: 1985 
All 200 1.9976 .0112 99 
001-020 1.2022 .0265 16 
021-050 1.4661 .0079 29 
051-100 1.6901 .0052 49 
101-200 1.9859 .0040 97 
Panel B: 1989 
All 200 1.9661 .0119 92 
001-020 1.1720 .0293 15 
021-050 1.4646 .0084 29 
051-100 1.6890 .0055 49 
101-200 1.9887 .0036 97 
Panel C: 1993 
All 200 1.9594 .0119 91 
001-020 1.1333 .0317 14 
021-050 1.4678 .0073 29 
051-100 1.6881 .0057 49 
101-200 1.9908 .0033 98 
Source: Best's Insurance Reports: Property-Casualty United States (Oldwick, 
New Jersey: A.M. Best Company, 1985, 1989, and 1993) and calculaLions from 
equation (1). 
for i = 1,2, ... , n, j = 1985,1986, ... ,1993 and 2:r=l Pi} = 1. From 
equation (1), it is obvious that 
n 
E.j = L Eij = nE.j. 
i=l 
To test the hypothesis of equality of a pair of total entropies E.j 
and E.k. for j, k = 1985, 1989 and 1993, the appropriate test statistic 
(assuming that a large sample approximation is appropriate) is 
where 
Z = E.j - E.k 
~n(sJ + Sf) (4) 
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Under the null hypothesis, the statistic Z has a standard normal distri-
bution. 
The results indicate that differences in total entropy are not sta-
tistically significant at (){ = 0.05, in which case IZI < 1.96. None of 
the computed IZI values for the groups of companies 20, 30, 50, and 
100 exceeds 1.96. The important conclusion from these results is that 
the levels of concentration among these groups remained virtually the 
same throughout the period 1985-1993. In other words, no substan-
tial shares of premiums written were transferred from one company to 
another. 
The picture looks a bit different when the comparisons are made 
between the groups at each period. Note in Table 1 that E increases in 
magnitude, indicating a decrease in concentration as one moves down 
the hierarchy from the top 20 companies to the bottom 100 companies 
for every period, thus pointing to the existence of larger concentration 
among the top 20 than among the next 30. In turn, there is more con-
centration among this group of 30 than among the smaller group of 50 
companies, which has higher concentration than the next group of the 
smaller 100 companies. The patterns, however, remain the same for 
every period. Concentration does exist, especially among the largest 
firms, yet the level of concentration has remained stable. 
The reorganization and mergers of recent years have not resulted in 
a perceptible increase in concentration in the property-liability insur-
ance industry, unlike what has happened in other services such as retail 
trade, electric and utilities, and the transportation sectors, as shown by 
O'Neill (1996). These services experienced large increases in concentra-
tion in recent years. 
6 Summary 
This paper focuses on measuring aggregate concentration using as 
units net premiums written of the 200 largest property casualty com-
panies, an important sector in the U.S. economy. Theil's entropy index 
is employed for the period 1985 to 1993. The index is not sensitive 
to measuring an increase in concentration among the 200 companies 
or by groups of 20,30, 50, and 100 companies. Concentration between 
these groups of companies remained stable for every period under con-
sideration. During the period under consideration which was marked 
by a substantial activity of mergers and takeovers the property-liability 
insurance industry cannot be accused of increasing its overall economic 
power in spite of the large number of mergers. 
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The findings that no perceptible increase is detected in aggregate 
concentration in the property-liability insurance industry do not pre-
clude the possibility that some lines of insurance have become con-
centrated as a result of recent mergers and acquisitions. Tests at the 
aggregate level may mask increasing trends in concentration on a by-
line basis. Past studies were conducted using data prior to 1990. Be-
cause mergers and acquisitions have been relatively high in the past five 
years, documenting changes in by-line concentration since 1989 would 
be useful. 
The debate whether industry concentration is due to growth of effi-
cient firms that manage to maintain low cost operations through econo-
mies of scale or whether concentration is due to collusion and suppres-
sion of competition continues. In the mean time, efforts must be made 
to provide empirical evidence as to whether concentration exists and, 
if so, whether it is increasing or decreasing over time. 
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